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Reformers have been hard at work in American cities for over a
century. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, city
governments have been struggling to plan their development,
eliminate waste, relieve human suffering, check or at least
moderate, the most vicious forms of exploitation, and create
humane, responsive agencies of government. The history of
these efforts is full of ironies and frustrations. Reformers
themselves have frequently clashed over whether the greatest
needs of the cities were improved management and more
efficiency or new political institutions which would allow
individual citizens greater influence over their government, two
aims which sometimes directly conflict. Institutional changes
often have led to outcomes wholly unexpected by those who
fought to bring them into being, and the reforms of one era
frequently have become the principal weapons of those resisting
change in later decades.
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This essay deals with a recent effort at urban reform, the
movement for community control over schools in America’s
largest cities. The efforts to achieve this goal have caused
monumental conflicts in several cities, notably New York, but
in the last few years decentralization plans have been accepted
in many large cities. These plans differ enormously, however,
from those initially proposed by reformers who wanted to force
centralized bureaucracies to deal more effectively with the
needs of black and chicano students. An examination of the
processes through which these plans were transformed provides
insight into the difficulties of making planned changes in
American cities. This study will demonstrate that putting
theories into practice is as difficult as ever.2 2
The object of this study is the controversy over school
decentralization in Detroit, Michigan, during 1969, 1970, and
1971. In September 1971, Detroit’s schools began operating
under a new, decentralized system, but this came about only
after two years of conflict. The outcome of this dispute raises
important questions about the nature of decentralization, the
future of racial integration, and the role of public opinion and
forms of direct democracy in determining the course of public
policy. This essay begins with a brief history of the decentrali-
zation controversy in Detroit and a report on recent changes in
basic attitudes toward racial integration among both blacks and
whites. This is followed by an analysis of public attitudes
toward decentralization and a description of reactions among
both racial groups to the effort to recall several members of the
Detroit Board of Education in August 1970, a major event in
the decentralization dispute. The paper concludes with a
summary of the findings and a discussion of their broader
implications.
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This study is based primarily on data collected from
newspapers and periodicals and from two surveys of public
opinion in Detroit, completed in 1967 and 1971. In the 1967
survey, 855 respondents were interviewed (394 whites and 461 1
blacks). Approximately 62% of the respondents in 1967 were
chosen in a sample of the households in the entire city; the rest
represent a supplementary sample of the zone within the city
in which Detroit’s 1967 civil disorders took place. In the 1971 1
survey, 568 respondents were interviewed (394 whites and 174
blacks). A sample of dwelling units, rather than housing units,
was used in the 1971 study in hopes of including more renters,
single men, and others often missed in sample surveys. In both
surveys, white respondents were interviewed by whites, blacks
by blacks.’
THE SETTING
THE PLANS AND THE CONTROVERSY
Detroit, Michigan, along with many other cities, now has a
decentralized school system. Eight new regions exist within the
district, each of which is presided over by five-member elected
boards. The central board of education has thirteen members,
eight of whom are representatives from the new regional boards,
and five of whom are elected from the citywide district at-large.
Regional boards have &dquo;responsibilities in personnel, curriculum
and budgets under guidelines set by [the] Central Board&dquo; (New
Detroit Now, 1970). Put this way, the system sounds relatively
simple, but the controversy which led to the adoption of this
decentralization plan was both involved and bitter.
The controversy began with the passage of the first Detroit
decentralization bill (Public Act 244) by the Michigan State
Legislature. This bill was introduced by state Senator Coleman
Young, a leading black politician, in the spring of 1969. By fall,
it was law. There was little opposition or excitement.
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Then came a series of studies and hearings by the Detroit
Board of Education on how to implement decentralization. The
hearings attracted more spokesmen from the black community
for separation than integration. Whites who appeared generally
opposed decentralization, but if it had to come, they also
expressed a desire for separation. The board had a series of
plans drawn up and on April 7, 1970, opted for one which
called for 7 local regions and changes in the feeder patterns of
12 of the city’s 22 high schools. The goal was to have racially
integrated districts of equal population.
The initial changes in school attendance actually required
were very small,’ but a large storm arose. (Detroit’s former
Superintendent of Schools, Normal Drachler, at a 1970 lecture
at the University of Michigan, attributes part of this passion to
the fact that under the plan eventual integration was at least
possible.) Some whites, quickly organized into a Citizens’
Committee for Better Education, began a petition drive to recall
the four board members who supported the plan.
The controversy soon was returned to the state legislature,
where the original decentralization bill, passed with so little
consideration or debate a year before, was hastily repealed. The
principle of decentralization was retained, however, in the new
bill (Public Act 49) passed in July 1970, which effectively
recalled three of the four board members who supported the
integration plan by changing the length of their terms so that
they ended in 1-December i 970. Under the new decentralization
plan, the governor appointed a boundary commission to design
the new regions. These new boundaries were to follow existing
school attendance areas as closely as possible and were not to
materially affect attendance patterns.
It was thought by legislative leaders &dquo;that these actions
would serve to stop the recall drive&dquo; (Detroit Free Press,
1970a)5 but the leaders of the white Citizens’ Committee for
Better Education decided to pursue their efforts in order to
warn future school board members never to resurrect the
integration plan. After several legal maneuvers, suits, and
countersuits, a three-judge panel of the Michigan State Court of
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Appeals on July 31, 1970 (a Friday), ruled that the recall
motion definitely would appear on the August 4 primary ballot,
barely four days later. Since this decision left only one weekend
for a campaign, the efforts of both sides were limited. The
citizens’ committee, being better organized, was able to mount
a door-to-door weekend campaign in favor of the recall, while
the opposition forces were virtually paralyzed.
In the August vote, the recall motion passed by approxi-
mately 105,000 to 75,000, with white districts supporting it
heavily and blacks in opposition. Turnout, as in any primary,
was low, the recall was at the end of the ballot, and blacks,
especially, had a high proportion of blank ballots on the issue.
Reaction to the recall was bitter on the part of school
officials committed to integration and the affected board
members. One school official said that &dquo;The song is ’community
control’ and the tune is ’Dixie’ &dquo; (Detroit Free Press, 1970b).
Recalled member Andrew Perdue lamented, &dquo;Where is every-
body ? Where are the people who helped get us elected-the
UAW, the NAACP and the others? Don’t they care anymore?&dquo;
(Detroit Free Press, 1970c; for a more comprehensive review of
the entire controversy, see Grant, 1971).
The answers to Perdue’s questions are crucial to an under-
standing of the future of integration in the city and the meaning
of decentralization as it is actually put into practice. The
newspaper of the black community castigated
those few black citizens who supported the recall movement under
the guise of achieving black power over black schools [but] were in
reality supporting white racist control of the total community,
including its schools.... The most disturbing thing about the black
voters among the silent majority that permitted the Detroit disgrace
on Tuesday, August 4 is their unawareness of the basic issue at stake.
The issue was not really desegregation in the high school-unwel-
come though that may be in certain sections of our city.
The business of desegregation was only the final straw. The real issue
was that the current board, sparked by the four recalled members,
put Detroit in the forefront of school systems with integrated
teaching staffs and truly integrated administrative staff at the top
policy level.
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The real issue was the rapid growth of black power at the controlling
levels of the school system. This is what was unforgivable for the
four liberal Board members. And this issue the black silent majority
completely overlooked [Michigan Chronicle, 1970] .6 6
Detroit is now operating with a so-called &dquo;Magnet School&dquo;
plan which involves the pairing of regions so that there are
adequate numbers of black and white students &dquo;to make
voluntary integration possible&dquo; (Magnet School Plan, 1971). In
each pair of regions, at least four high schools offer specialized
programs to attract interested students. Admission preference is
given to racial transfers in order to maximize integration.
Students, of course, may simply remain in their home school if
they wish (all high schools will retain comprehensive programs).
Each region has also established an experimental and superior
middle school (grades 5-8) designed to attract an integrated
student body. ’
BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL INTEGRATION
Although a majority of the blacks who voted were opposed
to the recall of the school board members, both the turnout and
the margin of victory in black neighborhoods was disappointing
to the advocates of racially integrated education. There was
obviously considerable confusion among black voters over this
issue, evidenced by the &dquo;curious absence of campaigning&dquo;?
noticed by several observers, and by the fact that in some areas
almost half the black voters simply neglected to mark their
ballots on the recall question.8 8 There were many factors
contributing to this electoral outcome, and the surveys we have
conducted in Detroit in 1967 and 1971 provide some insight
into the problems. Our interviews dealt with attitudes of blacks
and whites toward racial integration, and were designed to help
explain the behavior of leaders and followers on both sides of
this controversy.
In order to discover respondents’ attitudes toward racial
integration, a series of questions was asked both blacks and
whites, beginning with one about the most general sentiments
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of the respondents: &dquo;Speaking in general terms, do you favor
racial integration, total separation of the races, or something in
between?&dquo; The word &dquo;separation&dquo; was used instead of &dquo;segrega-
tion&dquo; in order to make that choice more attractive to black
respondents. Without this change, black respondents, remem-
bering the long struggle against legal forms of segregation,
would have been prompted to choose integration merely as an
expression of support for the legitimate aspirations of the black
community.
This general question evoked sharply different responses in
the two racial communities, as Table 1 illustrates, and also
uncovered the beginnings of an important shift in fundamental
aspirations among blacks. In 1967, blacks were overwhelmingly
in support of the ideal of integration, while whites were much
more uncertain and divided on the issue. The majority of white
respondents in 1967 chose the ambiguous &dquo;something in
TABLE 1
RESPONDENTS’ COMMITMENT TO AN INTERRACIAL SOCIETY
IN 1967 AND 1971, BY RACE (in percentages)
a. Total exceeds 100 because of rounding.
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between&dquo; option, with the remainder closely divided among
supporters of &dquo;integration&dquo; and &dquo;separation.&dquo; The attitudes of
whites changed very little by 1971, but during these four years
support for integration in the black community declined by 20
percentage points, with the option of &dquo;something in between&dquo;
increasing by 18 points, and &dquo;separation&dquo; by 2 points. Most
surveys of opinion among blacks in the recent past have shown
massive support for the ideal of racial integration, as did our
1967 survey (see Marx, 1969: 224-227 for a discussion of the
most recent survey data; Campbell and Schuman, 1968: 15-19;
Brink and Harris, 1967, also document this fact). Integration
always has been a vaguely defined concept, but during the last
thirty years it has remained one of the principal slogans of the
civil rights movement, a term which summarized the ultimate
goal of dignity and equality for black people. This clear sign of
declining support for integration is evidence of the beginning of
a new era in the history of American race relations.
On a more specific, policy level, the respondents were asked:
&dquo;Some people say that white and [black] children’ should go
to the same schools; others feel that they will learn more and be
happier in separate schools. What do you think?&dquo; If the
respondent said he believed they should attend the same
schools, the question continued with: &dquo;Do you agree or disagree
with this statement: Demonstrations to protest segregation of
schools are a good idea, even if a few people get hurt.&dquo; The
rcsults of this question, displayed in Table I B, showed marked
differences between the two racial communities on this issue.
Among white respondents in 1967, 30% believed that black
and white children should attend separate schools. Almost 70%
of the whites favored integration in the schools, but only 9%
would be willing to tolerate possibly disruptive demonstrations
to achieve the goal. Blacks in 1967 expressed massive commit-
ment to the goal of integration. The depth of this commitment
was revealed by the striking fact that 66% of the black
respondents said they would support potentially violent demon-
strations designed to achieve integration. When this same
question was asked in 1971, the whites were less enthusiastic
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about school integration, but 59% still supported the idea. The
black community, however, had undergone a profound change
which may have far-reaching political consequences. Although
88% of the black respondents still preferred school integration,
only 29% were now ready to risk violence to achieve the goal, a
drop of 37% from 1967. There is still a commitment to the idea
of integrated education, but no longer with the intensity and
passion which once accompanied this demand. It is certainly
significant that close to one-third of the 1971 black respondents
remained willing to risk violence to achieve school integration,
but broadly based community support for vigorous tactics of
this kind to reach the goal of integration had definitely begun
to evaporate.
The black community’s commitment to the goal of racial
integration seems to be waning, but in both 1967 and 1971,
overwhelming majorities remained convinced that integrated
educational facilities were desirable. The determination of
blacks to achieve integration in the schools was declining, but
this did not imply that separationist alternatives were neces-
sarily gaining in favor. The preference of blacks for integration
in education was duplicated in most other social spheres we
investigated, including such sensitive problems as control over
local businesses and the make-up of police patrols. 1 0 However,
integration had clearly lost its position with many as a
top-priority goal.’ 1
DECENTRALIZATION OF THE SCHOOLS
The brief recall campaigns and the flurry of legal activity
which surrounded the school decentralization controversy in
Detroit never resulted in broad, well-organized efforts to
educate the general public. The conflict over the issue involved
mostly community leaders, professional educators, and editorial
writers on the city’s newspapers. Because decentralization was
not debated at length over several years, it is doubtful that the
average citizens of the city were fully aware of the reasons why
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one plan might be preferred over another. Nevertheless, we
found that respondents had opinions on this issue and were
willing to express them. There were very few who responded
with &dquo;don’t know&dquo; or &dquo;can’t say&dquo; when approached:
There’s a lot of controversy these days in Detroit over the way the
public schools should be organized. Some people believe that the
schools will pay more attention to the needs of parents and students
if each area in the city elects its own separate school board; others
believe that the system would be more efficient and cheaper to
operate if it remains under the control of a single, citywide school
board. Which way would you prefer: separate area school boards or
a single, citywide school board?
Both racial groups displayed, in their answers to this
question, a preference for the older, centralized system, even
though decentralization plans then were being implemented.
The initiative for decentralization arose from the black com-
munity, but, as Table 2 illustrates, there was more support for
the idea among whites than among blacks.
Support for school decentralization came from minorities in
both racial groups, but from an important, strategically located
minority in the black community. The plan had been proposed
originally by members of the black political leadership and was
supported mostly by the upper-status, politically active ele-
ments in the community, as demonstrated in Table 3, where a
favorable attitude toward decentralization is correlated with
level of education. The relationship between educational level
TABLE 2
RESPONDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD SCHOOL
DECENTRALIZATION IN 1971, BY RACE (in percentages)
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS SUPPORTING
DECENTRALIZED SCHOOL BOARDS IN 1971
ACCORDING TO THEIR EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, BY RACE
and a preference for decentralization is strong (gamma of -.36).
This kind of support is especially important in a controversy of
this sort. The educated members of the community are likely to
take greater interest in a dispute over the school system, and are
more likely to be listened to by political leaders and the
professionals who operate the system. Many middle-class blacks
were anxious to employ the schools as instruments of reform in
which black students would gain a more affirmative identity
and a deeper knowledge of black culture. The rising concern
with the promotion of black pride and racial unity has begun to
dominate the thinking of this group. They were increasingly
convinced that decentralization would further these goals and
were less concerned over its impact on the achievement of racial
integration.
Black supporters of decentralization were exceedingly dis-
trustful of government in general. There was a very strong
relationship (gamma of .52) between the general level of trust in
govern men t, 1 2 measured by a modified version of the Survey
Research Center’s political trust scale and support for decentral-
ization. Those low in political trust were likely to advocate the
creation of smaller, neighborhood school boards to replace or
supplement the citywide board. These distrustful blacks hoped
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to gain greater access for the entire community to the
educational leadership under the new plan and hoped to stop
abuses they believed were being perpetrated against black
students by the allegedly insensitive and unresponsive central-
ized school administration.
Supporters of school decentralization in the white commun-
ity came disproportionately from working-class neighborhoods,
especially those in danger of being integrated as the black
population expanded. In Table 3, the highest levels of support
for decentralization came from those who had not completed
high school, but had some additional (usually technical) training
and from high school graduates. There is a fifteen percentage
point difference in support for decentralization between those
who have been to college and high school graduates.
Table 4 indicates the complex relationship between attitudes
toward integration and support for school decentralization.
Those in both communities who favored integration were more
likely to desire a single, citywide school board. In order to
check whether decentralization was merely a code word for
racial separation, respondents who selected separate area school
boards as their preferred alternative were asked: &dquo;Which do you
prefer, integrated districts which contain approximately equal
numbers of [ black and white children, or separate districts for
[blacks] and whites?&dquo; Those who favored general integration
were more likely to prefer integrated, decentralized districts.
Mote noteworthy, blacks were consistently more opposed than
whites to the idea of racially separated school districts, no
matter what their general views on integration. For the blacks,
community control did not necessarily imply separate schools,
although those opposed to general integration were more
favorable to the idea of decentralization. For separationist
whites, on the other hand, the notions of community control
and segregated schools tended to join neatly. In rejecting the




SUPPORT FOR SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION (and integration within
decentralized districts) BY GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD RACIAL
INTEGRATION IN 1971, BY RACE (in percentages)
a. N of 5 or less.
b. Totals not 100 because of rounding.
THE RECALL ELECTION
Detroit’s controversy over school decentralization took place,
for the most part, in the hearing rooms of the board of
education, the state legislature, and the courts. Debates between
lawyers and professional educators over technicalities attracted
little general interest, and information about the proceedings
was not easy to understand. There was only one point in the
course of the dispute when public opinion might have been
directly brought to bear, and that was the motion to recall the
members of the school board who had supported the decentrali-
zation plan which encouraged racial integration.
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About 35% of the total city electorate voted in the August 4,
1970, primary election when the recall appeared on the ballot.
Voters were given just four days’ notice that the recall would
be conducted, and a large number of ballots were left blank on
this issue, evidence of the public’s lack of knowledge and its
confusion and uncertainty over the issues at stake. The recall
had been instigated by groups in the white community who
objected to increased racial integration in the schools, and when
the way was cleared by the courts to add the motion to the
primary ballot, these groups immediately went into action to
inform their sympathizers and get them to the polls. There were
no comparable groups as well organized and as intensely
interested in this issue in the black community. Several small
black nationalist or separatist groups had spoken out against the
integrationist aspects of the proposed decentralization. More
important, the labor unions, the NAACP, and other civil rights
groups were not prepared to mobilize their followers to defeat
the recall. Even if prepared, it seems clear that their task would
have been difficult given the general lack of enthusiasm for
decentralization and waning interest in the vigorous pursuit of
integration. Intensity, organization, and commitment were all
on the side of those who supported the recall motion.
This disparity was reflected in the results of our survey,
taken several months after the recall election was over. When
respondents were asked if they remembered the recall election,
whites were much more likely than blacks to say that they did.
Table 5 shows that a greater percentage of whites at almost all
educational levels claimed they remembered the controversy.
This difference between the races is most apparent among the
best-educated members of the two communities. Over 80% of
whites with college training, for example, claim to have
remembered the event, compared to just over 60% of compar-
able blacks.
White were not simply reacting against the idea of decentral-
izing the schools in the recall, but rather against the threat of
increased racial integration. Among whites, there was a correla-
tion of (gamma) .43 between preferences for racially segregated
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS AT VARIOUS EDUCATIONAL
LEVELS REMEMBERING THE RECALL ELECTION OF
AUGUST 4,1970, BY RACE
school districts and support for the recall motion. It seems clear
that many whites saw a vote for the recall as a vote for the
maintenance of segregation.
The apparent apathy over the recall motion in the black
community is more difficult to explain. The established black
groups and civil rights organizations were caught by surprise
when the court gave its last-minute approval to the recall, and
almost no campaign against the motion was mounted. No
citizens’ committee or ad hoc coalition supporting integrated
decentralization plans had sprung up prior to the recall,
however-an indication that the idea had not developed deep
roots in the black community. The politically active, middle-
class black leadership did not carry on the vigorous campaign of
support which the integrationist school board members obvious-
ly had expected. One must speculate about the reasons for the
black leadership’s relative inactivity, but the principal causes
probably lie in their developing ambivalence about the ideal of
racial integration. There is support among upper-status blacks
for increased neighorhood control over the schools, but their
desire was to use this increased influence primarily to promote
black culture and increased self-esteem among black students.
This new emphasis conflicted somewhat with the drive of the
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school board majority to use the doctrine of neighborhood
control to achieve racial integration, and although most blacks
have not abandoned their support of integration, our data show
that they are beginning to lose the passionate sense of
commitment to the ideal which once existed. This ambivalence
and the lack of support for decentralization among lower-status
blacks probably restrained black leaders from taking action to
mobilize the community in favor of the original integrationist
decentralization plans. Massive support for integrated schools
still existed in the black community, as our survey showed, but
black leaders lacked the will, the commitment, and perhaps
even the ability, to bring this support into action. The
organizational initiative passed to those in the white community
who held conservative views on school integration. 1 3
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The struggle over decentralization of Detroit’s school system
began in the Michigan state legislature with little fanfare or
dispute. The motives of the original proponents were unambig-
uous. Decentralization in cities was a popular reform measure at
the time, and most legislators believed the reorganization might
possibly improve the system, and, in any case, was unlikely to
do any harm. Once the mandate to decentralize was given to the
existing board of education, however, boundaries of the new
districts had to be drawn, and it was impossible to ignore the
potentially explosive issue of racial balance in the schools.
Rather than dodge this issue, the school board decided to use
decentralization as a tool for breaking down existing racial
barriers. What began as an effort to improve the representative-
ness or responsiveness of the city’s educational bureaucracy
soon became also a new method to encourage racial integration.
When the original, integrationist decentralization plan was
made public, it stimulated a strong reaction in white neighbor-
hoods where schools were virtually segregated. New organiza-
tions sprang into being in these neighborhoods and a deter-
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mined counterattack was mounted in the state legislature, the
courts, and through the recall petition which eventually was
successful in preventing any changes in racial balances in the
schools. The burning issues of racial equality and discrimination
had been forced to the center of the dispute, overshadowing the
original questions of political and administrative organization
and bureaucratic rigidity, and creating a wholly different
balance of power for educational decision-making.
As the scope of the conflict widened and the central issues
changed, black leaders either were not able or were unwilling to
mobilize their followers in support of the integrationist,
decentralization plan. Our studies indicate that support for
integration is beginning to decline in the black community,
especially among members of the middle class, whose organi-
zational skills were required in these circumstances. Even
though there remained massive support for integration within
the black community, it could not be given expression without
the energies and resources of leaders skilled in the task of
mobilization.
The notion of decentralization, on the other hand, did not
have majority support in either racial community. Questions of
administrative and political organization, by themselves, are not
the kinds of issues likely to arouse intense concern among
average citizens, but for a sizable group of whites, decentrali-
zation was preferable because it was seen as a means to prevent
racial integration. Among blacks, the idea appealed most
strongly to the middle class, especially to those devoted to
promoting black culture and a new sense of self-respect, but was
not the kind of issue which could be used to bring large numbers
of black voters to the polls to oppose the recall. Many black
leaders wanted decentralization, but were unsure about integra-
tion ; such uncertainty did not supply the kind of stimulation
for action which fear of increased racial integration gave many
whites.
Policy-making for urban areas often takes place in legislative
bodies or government agencies far from the cities themselves.
The complex institutions of federalism, and the many legally
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autonomous, specialized decision-making forums like the educa-
tional system, allow little knowledge or concern for the desires
of the passive majority. The conflict over school decentrali-
zation in Detroit started with few participants, but once it
began to grow, the expansion was exceedingly uneven, with one
side, the segregationist whites, rapidly gaining adherents and
confidence, while black leaders remained divided and disorgan-
ized. The efforts of the whites were facilitated in this case by
legal delays which kept their opponents off balance, and,
ironically, by the use of a recall petition, a reform of the
Progressive era designed to encourage governmental responsive-
ness to majority will.
Little effort was made, either by the original sponsors of
decentralization or the school board members who decided to
use the plan to further integration, to gain public understanding
or build majority support for these proposals before they were
introduced. Indeed, that would have been a formidable task,
since few established organizations or institutions exist in the
city, especially in the area of education, which might easily have
been used to mobilize the public support needed on these
issues. There is little communication between elected repre-
sentatives and their constituents, so that officials are never sure
which of many competing voices actually represents the
majority will. In most cases, the system requires those who
object to policies adopted either by educational professionals or
elected representatives to create ad hoc organizations and stage
large-scale protests if they hope to see policies changed.
Officials in a system of this kind are not encouraged to take
serious account of any interests which are not already organ-
ized, present in the political arena, and expressing active
concern at the time decisions are made. The possibility always
exists that &dquo;potential groups&dquo; might be stimulated into action
by some outrageous decision, but since public awareness of
government actions is low, and the costs of organizing a protest
is extremely high, the possibility of decisions being overturned
in most cases is decidedly remote. In the Detroit decentrali-
zation dispute, protesting white citizens were passionately
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concerned and united in their cause; they not only mounted a
protest, but were successful in changing the offending policies,
two equally rare occurrence. 14 4
The political system produced an outcome in the Detroit case
pleasing only to a minority. Not only were the integrationist
school board members recalled, but a system which encouraged
racial separation was established, somewhat moderated by
addition of a modified &dquo;freedom-of-choice&dquo; plan of the kind
once popular in southern cities. Our surveys reveal considerable
ambivalence among both whites and blacks about terms like
decentralization and integration, and it is hard to determine the
depth and sincerity of their commitment to these ideals. There
are several indications, for example, that the support for school
integration expressed by many whites does not imply a
willingness to take any risks or make any sacrifices. Even
allowing for these reservations, however, the evidence indicates
that the preference of a majority of each race was a centralized,
integrated school system. The political system produced for
them, instead, a system which was decentralized and segregated.
NOTES
1. This movement has produced a large volume of literature, but the following
will provide good summaries of the aims and justifications of decentralization:
Altshuler (1970), Gittell (1971), Rogers (1968); see also Cunningham (1970).
2. Another study somewhat similar to this one which deals with the school
decentralization controversy in New York is Gittell (1971).
3. We will refer to our data as covering the city, but the study area included, as
well, Highland Park and Hamtramck, two small cities completely surrounded by
Detroit, and the Grosse Pointes, a cluster of small, upper-class suburbs along Detroit’s
northeastern border.
4. Approximately 3,100 of 290,000 public school students would have been
immediately affected and then only at the high school level.
5. The opponents of the recall were largely inactive because of a belief that the
issue would never be on the ballot and a general apathy about the whole matter
among many of the groups which usually support efforts at racial integration.
6. As of 1970, 63% of the students in the public schools of Detroit were black,
42% of the teachers, and 26% of the administrators. The latter two figures compare
very favorably with other large American cities.
[74]
7. This phrase was used by Moore and Johnston (1971: 428). For a discussion
of the campaign, see also Grant (1971: 74-75).
8. Vote fatigue is a common problem for black voters in municipal and state
elections. For studies in other settings, see Walker (1966, 1963).
9. Early in the interview, black respondents were asked, "One hears a lot of
different terms used these days to identify race. What term do you prefer when
talking about yourself?" Whatever term the respondent gave was used consistently
throughout the interview. For white respondents, the work "Negro" was used in all
cases.
10. Data on this subject from a survey done in Detroit in 1968 were reported in
Aberbach and Walker (1970a). More extensive analysis of 1971 data will appear in
Aberbach and Walker (forthcoming).
11. Further evidence for this can be found in answers given to a question in the
1971 survey, focused on housing, which attempted to prove the issue of priority
more directly when we asked "Which do you think is more important now-to build
more and better housing in and around areas where blacks already live or to build
integrated housing for blacks in other parts of the city and suburbs?" Only 17% of
the whites mentioned integrated housing, and, more importantly, only 37% of the
blacks chose that option.
12. The questions in the political trust index focused on the national and the
local level of government (see Aberbach and Walker, 1970b: 1203) for a description
of the measure.
13. In the elections for the eight new regional boards held in November 1970,
whites won control of six of these boards, blacks of the remaining two. Many white
segregationists were elected, while most of the successful black candidates were
integrationists. The central board previously had three black members out of a total
membership of seven; the central board has three blacks out of thirteen. Only
thirteen blacks were elected to forty-three seats on all the boards. The Detroit Free
Press (1970d) commented, "Detroit voters have elected the city’s most conservative
school board in at least six years."
14. The use of the concept of "the scope of the conflict" betrays our intellectual
debt to Schattschneider’s (1960) brilliant book. We have also gained special insights
from Gamson (1968a, 1968b), and the voluminous literature surrounding the group
and the pluralist theories of the political process.
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